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Agriculture’s “multifunctionality” was
discussed in two Commentator issues in 2004 (No.
454 and No. 456). In addition to food and fiber,
agriculture can be a source of both positive
(“good”) and negative (“bad”) externalities and
public goods. Examples of potential positive
externalities and public goods from agriculture
include: scenic landscapes, clean water, ecological
biodiversity, wildlife, flood protection, and carbon
sequestration. Public policy alternatives for
encouraging the positives and discouraging the
negatives were explained in those two previous
Commentators. Among the alternatives discussed
was support for environmentally friendly farming
practices. A subset of this alternative that is gaining
increased attention is “payments for environmental
services” (PES). In this Commentator, I explain
what is meant by PES and discuss some
considerations in developing PES policies. Then I
describe the history of two major PES schemes1 in
the United Kingdom (UK). I also describe the latest
developments in PES policy in England’s portion of
the UK.
Developments in agri-environmental policy in
Europe have important implications for the ongoing development of related policies in the US
(Dobbs and Pretty, 2004). It is critical that “lessons”
1

The term “scheme” is used here as do European policy
makers, where the term is interchangeable with “program”.
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be exchanged across the Atlantic. As the US moves
into new programs like the Conservation Security
Program that recognize (at least implicitly)
agriculture’s multifunctionality, we can draw on
experiences about what worked and what did not
work with European PES schemes. Moreover, the
European Union (EU) and the US are watching each
other’s PES schemes closely—as are other countries
watching those of both the EU and the US—in the
context of World Trade Organization negotiations
about the acceptability of different kinds of
payments to farmers.
Considerations in developing PES policies
Payments for environmental services represent
attempts to have the beneficiaries of positive
externalities and public goods from agriculture
provide compensation to the agricultural providers,
to assure such provisions will be initiated or
continue. This past June, I participated in a
workshop in Germany titled “Payments for
Environmental Services (PES)—Methods and
Design in Developing and Developed Countries”
that was organized by the University of Bonn’s
Center for Development Research and the Center
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR); the
latter is headquartered in Indonesia. The workshop
included presentations of case studies of PES
schemes from agriculture—including forestry—
from around the world. Among the case studies
were ones from Australia, Germany, Mexico, Costa
Rica, China, South Africa, the United States, and
the UK (this one prepared by myself and Jules
Pretty, of the University of Essex, in England).
CIFOR’s Sven Wunder, in two papers in the
references, has very clearly explained key
considerations in determining the conditions under
which PES schemes might be effective, as well as
the most appropriate forms for such schemes under

different conditions. I draw on these two papers in
the remainder of this section.
Wunder defines a PES scheme as one in which
there is “a voluntary, conditional transaction with at
least one seller, one buyer, and a well-defined
environmental service.” “Conditionality” means
that payments are only made—or continued—if the
environmental service is actually delivered. Often
the service itself can not be measured directly.
Rather, practices are monitored which are thought
(based on research or other evidence) to provide the
service being paid for. Buyers are usually
represented by some collective entity, such as a
water utility if the service being purchased is clean
water from farmers or foresters in a watershed.
Sometimes non-government organizations (NGOs)
serve as intermediaries between buyers and sellers.
The most common purchasing entities thus far,
however, have been government agencies,
representing broad public interests or service users.
Government agencies were the buyers in the UK
cases described in the next section.
PES schemes work best where the farming or
forestry practices required to provide the desired
environmental services are “marginally more
profitable” than the land use which does not provide
the services. If existing farming or forestry practices
are far more profitable, a PES scheme may be
prohibitively expensive. If existing practices are
less profitable than the proposed new practices, PES
may not be necessary. In that case, education about
the practices that will simultaneously provide more
private profit than formerly and provide the
environmental service may be sufficient to induce
adoption of the new practices. However, risk and
other constraints also may stand in the way of
adoption, in which case other measures instead of,
or in addition to, PES may be needed.
PES schemes in the United Kingdom
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
Ireland have had several major PES schemes in the
UK since the 1980s. One of the first such schemes
in all of the EU was the UK’s Environmentally
Sensitive Areas (ESA) scheme. After the ESA was
launched in 1986, it grew to cover 22 designated
areas in England and 10 in Scotland. Eventually,
there were 43 ESA designated areas in the UK as a

whole. ESAs covered specified areas of designated
high landscape or ecological value. These ESAs
encompassed about 14 percent of the total
agricultural land in the UK. Under the ESA system,
farmers entered up to 10-year voluntary
management agreements in return for annual
payments. Annual payments to farmers under the
England ESA schemes had grown to £53 million
($93 million) by fiscal year 2003. There were over
12,445 ESA agreements in England by then,
covering over 600,000 hectares—around 60 percent
of the eligible area. Enrolled area represented
approximately 6 percent of England’s agricultural
land.
The Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS)
was established in 1991, and has been available
only in England for land outside ESAs. It aims to
protect and enhance valued landscapes and habitats,
and improve the public enjoyment of the countryside. The scheme targets chalk grasslands, waterside
landscapes, lowland heaths, coastal lands, uplands
and historic landscapes, and orchards and meadows.
Again, farmers receive payments for entering
management agreements, usually 10 years in length.
There were more than 16,000 CSA agreements in
England by fiscal year 2003, covering more than a
half million hectares of land. Annual payments had
reached £52 million ($92 million), nearly the same
as ESA payments. Roughly 11 percent of England’s
agricultural land was covered by either ESA or CSS
agreements by 2003.
The UK case study paper (by myself and Jules
Pretty) in the references contains a detailed review
of the ESA and CSS experiences. Although the
ESA scheme and the CSS had somewhat different
purposes and design, their overall effects in the UK
were similar. The payments for environmental
services offered under these schemes were generally
attractive to farmers in the more ‘marginal’
agricultural areas; the payments tended to raise and
stabilize overall farm incomes for farmers in hill
areas and lower-yielding arable areas. The planning
and technical assistance offered supported the
achievement of stewardship goals. However, in the
more productive arable areas, it was difficult for the
stewardship payments offered under the ESA
scheme and the CSS to compete with the income
support and risk-reducing policies of the EU’s

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Just as in the
US Midwest, it is difficult to draw farmers away
from systems that involve only a few crops,
relatively routine operations, and substantial
government payments. The fossil fuel and
agrochemical-based technologies and large-scale
agricultural structure that have evolved over the last
50 years also inhibit a return to more diverse and
management-intensive farming systems. There also
is too little social capital to adequately support
movement to more complex, integrated farming
systems. However, necessary networks, marketing
institutions, and support groups are beginning to
take shape.
Recent policy developments in England
Agri-environmental policy in the UK, as
throughout the EU, is being influenced by the CAP
reforms of 2003. These reforms have moved Pillar I
(production) supports to a much more “decoupled”
basis. Starting in 2005, most Pillar I subsidies are
being moved to a new single payment, though
member states have some latitude to only partially
decouple—allowing some subsidies to continue
being paid on a headage or hectareage basis. The
new single farm payments are being determined
largely on historical payment bases. Although EU
farmers are gaining more flexibility to respond to
market signals under this more decoupled payment
approach, they will be subject to more
comprehensive environmental cross-compliance
provisions than in the past. The application deadline
for farmers in England to establish eligibility for
these single farm payments in 2005 and in the
future was mid-May of this year.
The greater decoupling under Pillar I should
help mitigate some of the disincentives for farmers
to enroll in the higher tiers of PES programs.
Overall, one would expect UK agricultural
production to become more extensive, with lower
applications of chemical inputs, and some
reductions in overall levels of commodity
production. However, as always, adjustments will
involve a complex set of interactions, and impacts
on the crops sectors could turn out to be more
modest than some expect, and some impacts on the
environment could actually turn out to be negative.
For example, decoupling could lead to greater
specialization in the cereals sector, leading to even

less biodiversity. Nevertheless, my view is that
greater decoupling offers real opportunities for PES
and other agri-environmental programs to
contribute more effectively to environmental
enhancement and sustainability.
Concurrent with the consolidation of payments
under Pillar I of the CAP, major changes are being
made in England’s PES schemes under Pillar II
(rural development and environmental objectives).2
The 2003 mid-term review of the CAP has been
implemented in England with the establishment of
three new PES schemes as of March 2005—Entry
Level Stewardship, Organic Entry Level
Stewardship, and Higher Level Stewardship. With
the introduction of these schemes, the CSS and the
ESA scheme—for the past 15-20 years the core
programs, along with support for organic
agriculture, of agri-environmental policy in
England—have been closed to new applicants.
The aim of the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS)
scheme, which is open to all who farm their land
‘conventionally’, is to encourage farmers to deliver
simple environmental management in addition to
cross-compliance requirements. This management
focuses on improved water quality, reduced soil
erosion, improved conditions for farm wildlife,
maintenance and enhancement of landscape
character, and protection of historic features.
Farmers have to complete a plan of the farm
showing the main environmental features, called the
Farm Environmental Record (FER), and select
options from a menu of measures that are rated with
points. At least 30 points per hectare are required
over the whole farm to qualify for the £30 per
hectare ($21 per acre) payments. The application is
for a 5-year term.
There remain complex relationships with the
CSS and ESAs. Where a CSS measure covers a
whole field, it has to be excluded from the ELS.
Land in ESAs is excluded from the ELS, and land
cannot count towards the ELS if it is part of an
English Nature management agreement.
2

Under the devolution of powers that has been underway for
some time in the UK, agri-environmental policies (as with
various other policies) often differ among the governmental
units of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Here,
reference is only to England.

The compulsory construction of a FER includes
nine elements: field boundaries, trees and woodland
protection, historic landscape features, buffer strips,
arable land wild bird measures, encouragement of a
range of crop types, soil protection, lowland
grassland management, and nutrient management
plans.

The new combination of PES schemes in
England appears to offer good prospects for further
enhancing agriculture’s multifunctionalilty in a
coordinated way that builds on experiences gained
with the CSS, the ESA scheme, and other PES
schemes.
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